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Abstract
In this paper we construct a framework for modeling teams of agents who apply techniques
or procedures (tools) to solve problems. In our framework, tools differ in their likelihood of
solving the problem at hand; agents, who may be of different types, vary in their skill at using
tools. We establish baseline hiring rules when a manager can dictate tool choice and then derive
results for strategic tool choice by team members. We highlight three main findings: First,
that cognitively diverse teams are more likely to solve problems in both settings. Second, that
teams consisting of types that master diverse tools have an indirect strategic advantage because
tool diversity facilitates coordination. Third, that strategic tool choice creates counterintuitive
optimal hiring practices. For example, optimal teams may exclude the highest ability types
and can include dominated types. In addition, optimal groups need not increase set-wise. Our
framework extends to cover teamwork on decomposable problems, to cases where individuals
apply multiple tools, and to teams facing a flow or set of problems.
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t Over the past thirty-five years the number of people employed as cognitive, nonroutine work-ers has doubled to sixty million. The job classifications for this category of workers includemanaging, designing, performing basic research, investing, strategic consulting, engineering,
and providing legal advice and medical care.1 The tasks carried out by cognitive, nonroutine
workers consist in large part of solving problems. Biomedical researchers isolate molecules.
Financial analysts build portfolios. Consultants develop reorganization plans. Engineers de-
sign batteries. Equally important, most problem solving is now done in teams. Therefore, the
study of problem solving is also the study of teams and teamwork.2
In this paper, we construct a framework for studying team performance on problem solving.
Specifically, we analyze the proability of success at problem solving given team composition
and then derive optimal hiring rules. Our framework assumes problem solvers who possess
skill of varying degrees at applying tools. Better problem solvers know more tools and are
more adept at applying them. Given that problem solving is done primarily in teams, our
framework focuses on teamwork. We assume that a team either succeeds or fails depending
upon whether any member of the group finds a solution. We do not constrain the definition
of a problem, so the binary nature of outcomes—success or failure—does not greatly limit
the scope of our framework. Any task that requires constraint-satisfaction (with or without
an optimization criterion), such as reducing the rate of defects in a manufacturing process by
a certain percentage or designing an internal combustion engine that exceeds environmental
standards while maintaining a torque profile, is admissible.
The difficulty of developing an optimal hiring policy stems from a lack of separability. Ability
corresponds to the probability of solving the problem, which in turn implies a facility with
potentially successful tools. Ability fails as a proxy for a person’s added value to a group
because the group may already contain people who possess the high ability person’s tools.
As a rule, the best team of problem solvers need not consist of the most able individuals
(Hong and Page 2004, Page 2008). In fact, for some classes of problems no measure applied
to individuals determines optimal team composition (Kleinberg and Raghu 2015). The best
person to add to a group will be the one most likely to apply a tool that is both novel and
effective. Therefore, optimal hiring depends on the group composition.3 If firms had little
1Data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. On the growth of the knowledge based economy see Bell (1973)
Wolff (2006), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) and Florida (2002). See also Radner (1993) on information-
processing firms.
2Teams predominate in the academy as well. The majority of science, and most of the best science, is
accomplished by teams, not individuals (Cooke and Hilton 2015). Over ninety percent of papers in science and
engineering have multiple authors (six to ten in the modal paper), as do over sixty percent of papers in the
social sciences. In both categories team authored papers are more than four and half times as likely to receive
one hundred citations (Singh and Fleming 2010, Uzzi et al 2013).
3Voting, forecasting, and reliability also violate additive separability. In reliability studies the probability of
collective failure equals the product, not the sum, of the probability of individual failures. The game theoretic
re-analysis of Condorcet jury theorems, pioneered by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), has incorporated both
nondecomposable production functions and strategic interaction. Team-composition, and the associated argu-
ment about the relative importance of ability versus diversity, have not been prominent topics in this program











t choice in whom to hire, this optimal hiring problem would not be relevant. That is decidedlynot the typical case. Alphabet, the parent company of Google, annually receives upwardsof three million applicants. Leading financial services companies and consulting companies
receive over a quarter of a million applicants. People analytics, the use of data and models
to make hiring decisions, has now become a standard tool (Bock 2015, Powell and Snellman
2004, Demsetz 1988, Conner 1991, Conner and Prahalad 1996).
Our analysis consist of two main parts. We first derive benchmark results where the manager
can assign tools to workers. We find that the manager wants worker types who are proficient
with distinct tools. Once we have a firm grasp of the sometimes subtle relations between
individual ability, team diversity, and group effectiveness, this decision theoretic result is not
surprising. We next consider the more complex strategic context in which the manager first
chooses workers who then autonomously choose tools. A worker’s payoff depends on some
combination of group success and individual credit. The manager’s optimal rule takes into
account that individual credit matters to workers. This results in what at first appear to be
counterintuitive hiring practices but which upon reflection are rational because they prevent
doubling up on tools.
This approach complements the traditional models of team performance that take membership
as fixed and focus on moral hazard (Holmstrom 1982) or both moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion (McAfee and McMillan 1991) in which an individual’s contribution to the team depends
on effort and ability. Their focus on shirking may be more appropriate for production and the
provision of services than for problem solving, where success can produce reputational rents.
To the extent that incentive problems matter in problem solving contexts, we believe they can
be handled separately from the competition arising from team composition.
Within the framework, we uncover direct benefits from cognitive diversity: teams with diverse
tools are more likely to find solutions to problems. In addition, we find that tool diversity
becomes more important both when average skill increases and group size increases because in
such situations existing tools are likely to have been applied correctly. We also find strategic
benefits from diverse teams. They have fewer coordination failures owing to lack of overlap in
their toolkits. We also find strategic advantages to hiring less able workers. Knowing fewer
tools can reduce the incentive to choose the wrong tool, e.g., selecting one already tried by
teammates. These findings echo a variety of strength-through-weakness results in game theory.
Last, extending the model to allow for partial solutions amplifies the benefits of applying more
diverse tools. Thus, our stark model is conservative: it stacks the deck toward ability and
simple rules and away from diversity and complex rules.
Our framework takes an agent’s facility with tools as exogenous. Workers can choose which
tool to apply given their set of tools. They cannot choose to become an expert at a new tool.
Robust empirical evidence shows that proficiency with a tool, particularly one that produces
however.











t economic value, requires specialized training and hundreds if not thousands of hours of practice(Ericsson et al 1993; Feltovich et al 2006). Consequently, groups that have tool diversity musthave team diversity, i.e., people trained in different methods.
To provide context for our results, we refer throughout to five hiring regularities that hold for a
CES production function given equal market wages: higher ability types should be hired earlier
(competency ordering) and in greater number (competency loading); all previous hires remain
in the optimal group as group size increases (monotonicity); a type that does not have the most
skill at some task will not be hired (no dominated hires); eventually all undominated types will
be hired (asymptotic diversity). These regularities bear repeating in more colloquial phrasing
to reinforce their normalcy: hire the most talented first, hire more of the more talented, do
not discard talent, do not hire ineffective workers, and increase worker diversity as the firm
grows.4 These regularity properties hold for a variety of production functions used in decision-
and team-theoretic models (Marschak and Radner 1972).
As we will show, optimal hiring for problem solving workers can violate each of these regular-
ities. Moreover, the violations are not knife edge cases; they arise under a range of reasonable
assumptions. While many of the violations result from incentive issues created by strategic tool
selection, some arise from properties of problem solving. For example, competency ordering
and competency loading can be violated even when the manager can assign tools to workers.
The violations arise when the tool kits of different types of workers overlap, i.e., have some
tools in common. Without overlap, optimal hiring would be straightforward.
The remainder of the paper has five parts. We begin with informal and formal descriptions
of our framework. We next derive benchmark results for the centralized structure where the
manager selects worker types as well as the tools deployed. We then turn to the decentralized
system in which problem solvers strategically choose tools. In the penultimate section, we
consider three natural extensions. We conclude by summarizing our key results and note some
implications.
A Framework for Problem Solving Groups
Our framework assumes a problem, a set of tools that can be applied to that problem, and
problem solvers with varying levels of facility with subsets of the tools. A tool can be interpreted
as an approach, technique, or method. Given a problem, each tool has a fixed, independent
4Define M types of labor (tasks), assume that each worker type has some capability with each type of labor,












i=1 αi = (1 − β). Given those assumptions all five regularities hold.











t probability of finding a solution. We further assume that a tool’s success can be observed.After a tool has been applied, the team knows whether or not the team solved the problem.5Two examples reveal the range of contexts to which the model can apply. First, tools can
represent techniques for finding solutions. For example, biochemists rely on four common
techniques for DNA sequencing: enzyme based methods such as the Sanger method, chemical
methods, single molecule sequencing using fluorescents, and real time detection of pyrophos-
phates (França et al 2002). In any one instance, each of these techniques may or may not work;
a priori, some techniques ma be more likely to sequence the gene. Those could be captured as
probabilities of success. In addition, a given researcher has some level of facility with a tool.
An experienced biochemist may be more likely to apply the Sanger method correctly than a
new hire.
Second, tools can correspond to types of technologies. There exist a variety of battery tech-
nologies including lithium ion, lithium sulfur, aluminum ion, and nickel-metal hydride. Each
technology has a storage capacity, recharge cycle, cost per cycle, self discharge rate, maximum
voltage, weight, temperature, and cost. The battery for a product, whether it be a smartphone,
rechargeable vacuum, or an electric car, must meet certain requirements. An engineer might
be an expert at one of these technologies. The model does not apply as cleanly to problems
such as writing a screenplay in which no problem gets solved even though there does exist a
final outcome that either succeeds or fails.6 Nor does it apply to problems that are embedded
in the production process, most of which are known to be solvable by less-skilled workers at the
bottom of an organizational hierarchy (Garicano 2000; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006).
Given a problem, we partition problem solvers into types based on their tool kits and their
facility with their tools. We define two problem solvers to be of the same type if they have the
same tool kits and apply each tool correctly with the same probabilities (Newell and Simon
1972, Jonassen 2002).7 One type might correspond to recent college graduates who worked
in research labs developing lithium ion batteries, another type might consist of engineers who
have spent a decade working with solid state battery technologies. In this example, the first
type of worker might have less facility with a better tool.
We implicitly assume a time-constraint by requiring each type to choose a single tool. She
cannot start over if she misapplies a tool or it fails to solve the problem. This assumption
holds provided applying a tool requires time or resources. It allows us to model a individual’s
choice of a single tool as an action in a game.8 The person solves the problem if she applies
5In a companion paper we allow for the possibility that different methods improve the status quo by different
amounts.
6Using the problem-categories of Terwiesch and Xu (2008), our framework applies to expertise based projects
and trial and error projects but not ideation projects.
7This probability can be interpreted as applying a tool in an appropriate manner to a given class of problems.
In this paper we consider only one type of problem, so we do not need to condition tool-skill on the kind of
problem.
8Assuming that types apply all of their tools would produce identical results in some cases. In other cases
(when toolkits overlap) that assumption would produce correlation in the probabilities of success. This would











t the tool correctly and the tool works, i.e., succeeds in solving the problem.As noted, problem solvers work as part of a group or team. The team solves the problem ifand only if at least one of its members finds a solution. The ability of a type is defined as the
expected probability that that type solves the problem using its best tool, i.e., the one that,
of all the type’s tools, is most likely to solve the problem. The ability of a team equals the
expected probability that at least one person in the group solves the problem.
Because a team’s ability depends on the number of distinct and correctly implemented tools,
individual ability is only a crude proxy of value to a team. This feature of collective problem
solving provides intuition for why hiring the best type (competency loading) fails under mild
assumptions. Once a tool has been used correctly, the team does not need more people who
will choose that tool. In contrast, a less able type may be needed in abundance if low ability
stems from the difficulty of deploying a tool. The manager of a large team might want many
of that inferior type to increase the probability that somebody correctly applies that type’s
unique tool.
Many of our results depend on whether tools are assigned or chosen strategically. This in turn
is often a product of the environment. In some contexts a manager has sufficient knowledge,
authority, and monitoring capability to assign tools. This might be true in a research lab
where the lead researcher knows the tools and assigns them to students. Assuming that
the requisite conditions (e.g. knowledge) hold, this kind of centralized regime is a best case
scenario as it avoids strategic coordination problems and incentive effects. In other situations,
however, managers lack tool-specific knowledge, cannot verify choice of tool, or verification
is prohibitively costly. The manager can then select personnel but not the tools that team
members use. Here, once the manager selects problem solvers, she has no authority over their
tools. The workers will select tools strategically: the set of chosen options will be a Nash
equilibrium of a game.
To construct the game over tool choices, we define payoff functions in terms of a collective
payoff if the team solves the problem and an individual payoff for those team members whose
selected tools solve the problem. The private benefit could come in the form of money, repu-
tation in the organization, or status within the team. The collective component, which could
come from profit sharing, aligns problem solvers’ incentives with those of the manager. Even
then, however, strategic tool choice introduces coordination problems. Two problem solvers of
the same type may have an incentive to choose their best tool rather than differentiating for
the good of the organization. This distortion produces violations of both monotonicity and
competency ordering. These can sometimes be overcome if individuals choose tools sequen-
tially. That strategic tool choice introduces coordination failure, order effects, and misaligned
incentives should come as no surprise. Clearly, the centralized process should outperform the
affect our results quantitatively but not qualitatively. However, assuming that individuals can try their entire
toolkit removes any possibility of strategic tool choice, a focus of our analysis.











t strategic one. That said, centralized tool-choice may require unacceptable levels of authorityor infeasible levels of knowledge and observation, thus running afoul of Hayekian critiques ofcentralization (March and Simon 1958; Nickerson and Zenger 2004).9
The Formal Model and Definitions
We now introduce the formal model. We assume the game form and all parameters, including
the number of types, the number of tools, and the probability that each tool can solve the
problem, are common knowledge.
The set of tools K = {1, 2, 3, . . .K}, denoted by tk.
The set of types of problems solvers M = {1, 2, 3, . . .M}, denoted by si.
The set of tools in type si’s tool kit, T (si) = {tk : type si can use tk}.
A group, G, is a finite nonempty set of types that can contain multiple members of a type.
A problem, X = (P,H), where p(tj) denotes the probability that a correctly applied tool
tj solves the problem, with p(tj) ∈ (0, 1) for all j, and where hsi(tj), type si’s skill with
tool tj on problem X, denotes the probability that si correctly applies tj on problem X, with
hsi(tj) ∈ (0, 1] for all i and j. Further, p(tj) 6= p(tl) for any j 6= l, and we order tools by their
success probabilities: p(tj) > p(tl) ⇐⇒ j < l.
Two assumptions merit emphasis: any tool might solve the problem but none is guaranteed
to do so, and a tool’s success probability, p, does not depend on the type who applies it. The
second assumption implies that if a tool doesn’t solve the problem when applied correctly by
one problem solver then it will not solve the problem when tried by anyone else. Thus, if a
physicist fails to solve a problem using spectral analysis then a mathematician who tries that
method will also fail. (Types may differ, however, in their skills at applying tools, i.e., in the
h’s.) Note that we allow for the possibility that a type can with certainty apply some tool
correctly (h = 1). We can rank a type’s tools by their overall success probability: the product
of the probability the type can apply the tool correctly and the probability that the tool will,
if correctly deployed, solve the problem. The overall success probability of tool tk for type si
therefore equals hsi(tk) · p(tk) as shown in figure 1.
The notion of ability plays an important role in our analysis. We define a type’s ability as the
probability that that type solves the problem using its best tool. To avoid overcomplicating
the analysis, we assume that each type has a unique best tool, the one with the highest overall
success probability for that type. We denote the best tool of type si by t
∗(si).
10
9Such critiques do not apply to production-problems encountered so often that managers know strictly more
than their subordinates (Garicano 2000; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
10 For example, suppose type si has capabilities (0.4, 0.5, 0.9) with tools t1, t2, and t3, which solve the
problem with probabilities 0.6, 0.5, and 0.2, respectively. The best tool for type si is tool t2 which has an

























Figure 1: How ability depends on skill and a tool’s probability of success
The ability of type si, a(si) equals hsi(t
∗(si)) · p(t∗(si)), the probability of solving the problem
using si’s best tool.
We say that a type is dominated if for every tool in its repertoire there exists some other type
who can better apply that tool.
Type si is dominated if for any tk ∈ T (si), there exists an sj s.t. tk ∈ T (sj) and hsj (tk) >
hsi(tk).
We say that a type is pairwise dominated if it takes only one type to dominate it. Clearly,
pairwise domination implies domination but the converse need not hold.
Type si is pairwise dominated if there is a type sj such that T (si) ⊆ T (sj) and hsi(tk) <
hsj (tk) for all tk ∈ T (si).
Hereafter, we refer to the type that can best apply a tool as the expert at that tool. (Note that a
type is undominated if and only if it is an expert at some tool.) We define the promise of a tool
to be the product of the likelihood that the tool solves the problem and the probability that
its expert applies it correctly. We assume throughout that success of any tool is independent
of that of any other tool.
The promise of tool tk equals hs∗i (tk)p(tk), where s
∗
i is the expert for tool tk, i.e., the type
with the largest hs(tk). We assume throughout that each tool has a unique expert, denoted by
s∗(tk).
A group solves a problem if and only if at least one of its members solves the problem.11 The
payoff to a type depends on whether the team solves the problem (a collective benefit) and on
whether she is among those who find a solution (a private benefit).
expected probability of solving the problem of 0.25.
11Formally, the probability that a group G consisting of the two problem solvers, si and sj , solves the problem
using tools tk and t` respectively equals hsi(tk) · p(tk) + hsj (t`) · p(t`) − hsi(tk) · p(tk) · hsj (t`) · p(t`).











t The payoff to type si can be written as follows:u(si, G) = 0 if C = ∅= b ∈ [0, 1] if si 6∈ C 6= ∅
= b+ (1− b)f(|C|) if si ∈ C
where C denotes the set of problem solvers in G who solve the problem and f(|C|) > 0 for
C = G and f(·) is strictly decreasing in |C|. Thus the maximal payoff accrues to an agent
who is the only person on the team to solve the problem (sharing glory diminishes it); team
failure generates the minimal payoff.
Under centralized tool choice, tool promise is a key measure. The manager can in effect select
and assign tools, matching type to promise. Under strategic tool choice, the manager cannot
assign tools. Here, tool overlap can create inefficiencies: a type may choose a personally better
tool already used by someone else rather than an as-yet-unrepresented one.
We define five categories of tool overlap. First, we separate out those cases that include a
dominated type, i.e., a type that is not expert at any tool. We then define four nested sets
of undominated types. First, types might have no overlap in tools (B0). In this case, a new
type always tries a new tool. This decomposability of toolkits simplifies the manager’s team-
composition problem.12
Next, types might overlap on some tools but not on their best tools, i.e., each type’s best tool
is exclusive to that type (B1). A further weakening would be to allow for overlap on best tools,
requiring only that each type is the expert at its best tool (B2). If recent college graduates know
lithium-ion technology better than any other battery technology, then experienced types, who
may know something about designing lithium-ion batteries, must know less than the recent
graduates. Last, each type can be the expert for at least one tool (B3), though not every
type needs to be expert at its best tool. A college graduate may know just a little about a
potentially useful lithium sulfur battery but that might be more than anyone else. (A college
graduate’s best tool, however, might be common in the industry and most skillfully deployed
by experienced types who have acquired craft knowledge.) A type that is not expert at its best
tool but is expert at some other tool can lead to inefficiencies under strategic tool choice. For
example, suppose that type j has a high skill level with tool k, but that tool is better applied
by other types. Type j is the best at tool `, but that method has little chance of solving the
problem. Private incentives might lead a type j to choose tool k rather than tool `. Under
centralized tool assignment, the manager can require type j to use tool `. Under strategic
tool choice, the manager has no guarantee that type j will not choose tool k instead. Figure
1 shows the five types of tool overlap in graphical form.
No Overlap (B0): T (si) ∩ T (sj) = ∅ ∀i, j
Exclusive Best Tools (B1): t
∗(si) 6∈ T (sj) ∀i, j
12Decomposability generally makes problems easier to solve (Simon 1962).




























Figure 2: Classes of Tool Overlap Across Types
Thus, either a type is dominated (set D) or it isn’t (set B3). If it is undominated then either
it is best at its best tool (set B2) or it isn’t (the shaded part of B3 that is not part of B2).
And so on until we reach the smallest circle, B0 — different types have completely different
toolkits (i.e., no overlap).
Our initial analysis derives necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal hiring to satisfy the
following regularity properties:13
Hiring satisfies competency ordering if for any types si and sj such that a(si) > a(sj) at
least one si is hired before an sj is hired.
Hiring satisfies competency loading if for any types si and sj such that a(si) > a(sj) the
number of type si’s weakly exceeds the number of type sj’s .
Hiring satisfies monotonicity if | G′ |>| G | implies that for all si, the number of si’s in
group G′ weakly exceeds the number in group G.
Hiring satisfies no dominated hires if no type that is dominated is in any group picked by
13The analogy between problem solving and production requires interpreting our probability of solving the
problem as a quantity. That is slightly problematic in that the probability of solving a problem is bounded,
whereas product-quantity is not. However, none of the counterintuitive solutions that we find appear to be
caused by the fact that success-probabilities are bounded; instead, they are caused by interactions between the
types of problem solvers.











t the manager.Hiring satisfies asymptotic diversity if for a sufficiently large group size, the group con-
structed by the manager includes at least one of each undominated type.14
Centralized Tool Choice
In centralized tool choice the manager selects a set of types in the first stage. In the second,
she assigns tools to those types. In that stage the manager assigns each tool to its expert.
Centralized tool choice requires that the manager can monitor and enforce the techniques
problem solvers apply. We make that assumption so as to provide a benchmark, first-best
probability of success.
Suppose first that for each tool tk there exists a type, si, that can flawlessly apply tk, i.e.,
hsi(tk) = 1. Hiring decisions become straightforward: for any given size group, G(n), the
manager will select the n best tools in stage two; working backwards, she then selects each
tool’s flawless type in stage one.15
Next, suppose that there exists a type that dominates all other types. In this case, the optimal
group consists only of this dominant (hence best) type.
Observation 1. For all group sizes, the optimal group under centralized tool choice consists
only of the best type if and only if the best type dominates all other types.
The straightforward proof of this observation – the manager wants to hire the expert for each
tool, and a single type is the expert for all tools – should not undermine the fact that it reveals
how strong an assumption must be made for hiring only the most talented to be an optimal
strategy. Hiring just the highest ability type makes sense only if that type is the expert at every
tool. Breadth and depth of talent will often be at odds with one another. Breadth entails less
depth; conversely, great depth requires specializing in a few tools. If either condition fails to
hold then for some size n, the optimal group will contain multiple types.
To analyze more complicated cases, we assume that the project manager hires sequentially,
adding the type that maximally increases the probability of success. A new type can increase
the probability of success if and only if she selects and correctly applies a tool that nobody in
the status quo group applies correctly. (If somebody in the status quo group picks tool tj but
misapplies it, then a new type can add value by selecting tj and using it correctly.)
To characterize the marginal value of adding type si using tool tk to group G, we let G(FAIL, tk)
denote the event that everyone in G fails to solve the problem and tool tk is applied correctly by
somebody in G. In that case, problem solver si cannot add value because tool tk cannot solve
14Note that hiring could satisfy asymptotic diversity but not the property of no dominated hires. If so, the
optimal group would include all of the undominated types as well as some dominated ones.
15Just because the manager’s hiring problem is easy need not imply that the problem that the team will try
to solve is easy. The probability that a group of size n will solve the problem could be arbitrarily close to zero.











t the problem even when an agent deploys it correctly. Similarly, let G(FAIL,¬tk) represent theevent that everyone in G fails but nobody has correctly applied tk. (Perhaps nobody even triedtk.) In this case, type si can only be pivotal, i.e., be the unique problem solver to find the
solution, if she applies tool tk correctly and tool tk solves the problem Hence, the probability
that type si is pivotal for group G using tool tk equals Pr[G(FAIL,¬tk)] · hsi(tk)p(tk). These
concepts and properties are the building blocks of the next result.16
Proposition 1. (Optimal Hiring Rule: Centralized Tool Choice) Under centralized
tool-choice, the optimal addition to group G is the type si who can be assigned a tool tk that
maximizes
P+(si, G) = Pr[G(FAIL,¬tk(G))] · hsi(tk(G))p(tk(G))
Proposition 1 reveals the contributions of diversity (applying a new tool) and ability (the skill
to use a tool correctly). The following corollary shows that neither diversity nor individual
ability predominates. In the conditions for the corollary, type si has more ability and type sj
adds diversity. By altering group composition, either ability or diversity can matter more.
Part (i) states a condition for type sj to add diversity but not improve group success as much
as type si. Part (ii) depicts the opposite situation. One type, si, has an edge in ability that
suffices to make it more valuable to group G. Yet sj ’s diversity-advantage would make sj more
valuable for some other group G′ with the same tools as G.
Corollary 1: Let T(G) denote the tools used by the members of the group G. Given
centralized tool-choice, assume that T (si) ⊆ T (G), whereas T (sj)
⋂
T (G) = ∅.
(i) If P+(sj , G) > P
+(si, G) > 0 then there exists an ε > 0 and an sj′ with T (sj′) = T (sj)
such that if max{hsj′ (tk)} < ε then P
+(si, G) > P
+(sj′ , G).
(ii) If a(si) > a(sj) and P
+(si, G) > P
+(sj , G) > 0 then there exists a G
′ with T (G′) = T (G)
such that P+(sj , G
′) > P+(si, G
′).
We now state a benchmark result (see figure 3) about the regularity properties for centralized
tool choice. In this setting, a type’s value rests on being expert with a tool. A type that has
high ability but is not expert at any tool would never get hired under centralized tool choice.
Proposition 2. Under centralized tool-choice, optimal groups
(i) Can violate competency loading for any type of tool overlap.
(ii) Satisfy competency ordering if and only if each type is the expert at its best tool (B2).
(iii) Never include dominated types.
(iv) Always satisfy monotonicity.
(v) Satisfy asymptotic diversity if and only if each type is best at some tool (B3).
16The optimal addition to a given group, identified in Proposition 1, is generically unique. In knife-edge cases
there are multiple such additions.
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Figure 3: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Regularity Properties: Centralized Tool
Choice
The proof of part (i) is straightforward. Competency loading is violated if there are more low-
ability types in an optimal group than a higher-ability type. This can happen if the more able
type is highly skilled at its assigned tool. Suppose, for example, that s1, the most able type,
uses its best tool, t1, correctly with probability one. If that is s1’s only tool then an optimal
group contains only one agent of this type. If a less able type, say s2, deploys its assigned tool
with a probability less than one then hiring multiple s2’s could be optimal. Hence, the less
able type would be more numerous, which violates competency loading. However, even with
no overlap — indeed, even if all types have singleton toolkits — the conditions for competency
loading to hold are quite restrictive: the types with the highest probability of solving the
problem cannot be more likely to use their tool correctly than is any other type .
Part (ii) holds because A type’s ability (competency) equals its probability of solving the
problem with its best tool. If toolkits don’t overlap (B0) then types will be hired in order of
ability. That assumption, though sufficient, is not necessary. A weaker sufficient condition for
competency ordering to hold is that each type be the expert at its best tool (B2). To prove
that condition B2 is sufficient, consider a manager choosing between two new types, si and sj .
Assume without loss of generality that si is more able. By assumption, each type is expert
at its best tool. It follows that neither type’s best tool has yet been assigned and that, by
Proposition 1, the manager will instruct the chosen type to try its best tool. Therefore, the
manager’s optimal personnel choice between si and sj is whichever type has the more promising
best tool. Given B2, the promise of a type’s best tool equals the type’s ability. Hence, if si
is more able than sj , its best tool is more promising than sj ’s, whence the manager’s optimal
personnel choice is si, so competency ordering holds.
To prove that condition B2 is necessary we consider the case where si knows how to apply only
one tool, tk̂. As before, si is more able than sj . Here, however, there exists an sk who is better











t at tk̂ than si is. For example, suppose that the best technique for finding a bug in computercode is to evaluate error messages, the second best technique is to divide and conquer, and thethird best is to write internal checks, with success probabilities of .4, .3, and .2, respectively.
Suppose type s1 can evaluate error messages perfectly and write internal checks half of the time.
Hence, it is the best type. Assume that type s2 correctly evaluates error messages or write
internal checks seventy percent of the time. Finally, suppose that type s3 successfully applies
divide and conquer techniques half the time. Given our assumptions, the second type is more
able than the third type but s2’s ability is based on its skill at evaluating error messages—a
tool that could be better applied by an s1. The optimal hiring rule involves first hiring an s1
followed by an s3 and only then hiring an s2. This violates competency ordering.
Result (iii) holds because in the centralized system optimal groups include only experts. Be-
cause an expert is better than any other type regarding at least one tool, experts are undom-
inated, thus ruling out dominated types. For intuition for result (iv) consider a group whose
members apply unique tools. Each type must be an expert at its tool. The manager will
never reverse her plan of telling si to try tk as the group gets larger. The general proof (in
the appendix) relies on the independence of tool success. Finally, the result on asymptotic
diversity (v) follows from the fact that any tool might solve the problem and no tool solves the
problem for sure. Therefore, every sufficiently large group, includes an expert for each tool.
Asymptotic diversity therefore requires B3. If not, a type that is not an expert for at least
one tool would never be added to the group.
The previous proposition implies, among other things, that hiring by ability would not be
optimal. Nor would hiring by diversity, if we define that as hiring the type most likely to
correctly apply an untried tool. Moreover, even if the highest ability type is also the most
likely to apply an untried tool, that type may be suboptimal, as we show below. In fact, we
show that such rules of thumb can produce marginally worthless hires.
A hiring rule H that selects type H(G) given the group G produces a marginally worthless
hire if for any ε > 0, there exists a group Gε and a type sj 6= H(Gε) such that P+(H(Gε), Gε) <
εP+(sj , Gε).
A marginally worthless hire increases the probability of solving the problem by ε times the
increase from some other type.
Remark 1: Under centralized tool choice, hiring by diversity can produce marginally worthless
hires even with No Overlap (B0). Hiring by ability or (if possible) by ability and diversity can
produce marginally worthless hires unless types are Experts at Best Tools (B2).











t Strategic Tool ChoiceUnder strategic tool choice the manager determines the composition of the group but cannot
control what tools the individuals select. Instead, each member of the group chooses a tool
taking into account the choices of the other group members. The extent to which strategic
tool choice creates coordination and incentive problems depends on the number of tools in
each type’s toolkit, on the overlap across toolkits, and on the importance of private benefits.
If all toolkits are singletons then the manager’s problem is easy, as it is de facto equivalent to
centralized tool choice. When the types have multiple tools, incentive problems can arise and
there may be multiple equilibria. In such circumstances strong common interests (high b) or
a decomposable skill-structure (nonoverlapping toolkits) simplify the manager’s problem. The
extent of coordination problems also depends on whether workers choose tools simultaneously
or sequentially.
Simultaneous Tool Choice
We first consider the case in which each member of the group simultaneously selects a tool or
a probability distribution over tools. Under this assumption, a symmetric equilibrium must
exist; further, if tool kits do not overlap then problem solvers apply tools that have higher
promise with higher probability.
Proposition 3. Given any number of types and any number of tools, an equilibrium exists in
which every member of a type chooses the same distribution over tools. Further, if problem
solvers’ tools do not overlap and hsi(tj) ≥ hsi(tj′) for j < j′, in equilibrium type si applies tool
tj with higher probability than it applies tool tj′.
A less intuitive comparative static result follows as a corollary (given non-overlapping toolkits).
If either there exists a large private benefit from solving the problem or the group of problem
solvers is sufficiently large, then introducing a new type of problem solver creates incentives
for those already in the group to shift toward better tools.
Corollary 2: Assume problem solvers have non-overlapping toolkits, choose tools strategi-
cally, and that given a group G, type si plays a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium strategy
~q∗(G) = (q∗1(G, si), q
∗
2(G, si), . . . , q
∗
K(G, si). If a problem solver who uses a new tool is added to
the group, then the change in the probability that si chooses tool tk is increasing in hsi(tk)p(tk).
Our next two propositions give conditions for the group to be composed only of the best type to
be optimal and for the most diverse group to be optimal. The first result requires a dominant
type and a small private benefit.
Proposition 4: Consider a group of fixed size under simultaneous tool choice. If type s1
dominates all other types and b is sufficiently close to one then (a) any pure Nash equilibrium











t of this homogeneous group of the best type implements the first-best outcome and (b) no othergroup can implement the first best.
Although a homogeneous group of the best type generates multiple equilibria, this causes no
problems for the manager if the members of the group are oriented primarily toward group-
effectiveness. In such circumstances the individuals will not overuse more promising tools: if it
is collectively optimal for some team members to select less promising tools, this will happen
in equilibrium. The combination of low conflict (group effectiveness is everyone’s priority) and
a type that dominates all others in ability yields intuitive team-theoretic effects (Marschak and
Radner 1972): the manager can hire the type that is obviously the most competent and the
group members will do exactly what she wants. This team-theoretic logic fails if the private
benefit from solving the problem is high. In such circumstances the optimal team may contain
multiple types, even though one type dominates all others. For the most diverse group to be
optimal, no one type can be better at two tools than some other type is at its best tool, a
condition we formalize as follows:
Definition We say that best tools are more promising if the following condition holds: if tj
is the best tool of some type and tk is not the best tool of any type then hsj (tj) > hsk(tk),
where sj is the expert for tj and sk is the expert for tk.
Proposition 5: Consider a group of fixed size under simultaneous tool choice. If best tools
are exclusive and more promising and min(hsi(t
∗(si))) is sufficiently close to one then (a)
the unique pure Nash equilibrium of the group that is fully diverse and satisfies competency
ordering implements the first-best outcome, and (b) no tool vector selected by any other group
implements the first best.
When best tools are exclusive (B1) and the team is fully diverse (every team member is a
different type) then for all b each agent has a strictly dominant strategy of picking her best
tool. Hence this vector of tools is realized in the unique Nash equilibrium. Further, this
equilibrium is the first-best solution if the hiring in stage one satisfied competency ordering,
best tools are more promising than other tools, and the corresponding h’s are sufficiently close
to one. Finally, no other team can satisfy all of these criteria, so all fall short of the first-best.17
Strategic tool choice will typically not cause distortions if the game has a unique Nash equi-
librium which implements the first best outcome. The next result, however, shows that rather
stringent conditions must be satisfied in order to ensure the existence of a vector of tool-
choices that is both optimal for the manager and the unique strategic equilibrium for the team
members.
Proposition 6: Under simultaneous tool choice, the following hold in any unique pure Nash
equilibrium that produces the first best tool-vector and outcome in stage two:
17They fall short in a strong way: Propositions 4 and 5 both show that non-optimal groups cannot produce
the first best outcome in or out of equilibrium.











t (i) Every problem solver of a given type selects the same tool.(ii) Each type is the expert at the tool that it selects.(iii) Each tool is selected by at most one type.
(iv) Only the best type, s1, must select its best tool, t
∗(s1).
In Proposition 6 condition (i) must be satisfied or multiple equilibria exist. If two problem
solvers of the same type choose distinct tools in an equilibrium, then there exists a second
equilibrium in which they switch their tool choices. Condition (ii) must hold because optimality
requires that each tool be tried by its expert. Condition (iii) follows from our assumption that
each tool has a unique expert. Condition (iv) holds because a type need not be the most skilled
at its best tool, but the incentives must be such that it chooses a tool for which it is the most
skilled type, i.e., it is the expert for that tool.
If types have overlapping toolkits then multiple equilibria may exist. For example, suppose
that s1 and s2 have the same toolkit of {t1, t2}, with s1 the expert at t1 and s2, of t2. If the
types’ skills at each tool are similar (the difference between, e.g., hs1(t1) and hs2(t1) is small)
then a heterogeneous two-person team will exhibit two pure equilibria: in one, each tool is
tried by its expert; in the other, the opposite occurs.
Multiple equilibria may not present a difficult problem for a self-organizing group if b is close
to one. The general intuition is that strategic tool choice can work ‘well’ if problem-solvers are
motivated primarily by team-success. The following result verifies part of this intuition. Note
that this result, unlike Proposition 6, does not assume that the tool choice game has a unique
pure Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2: Suppose for a fixed n there is a unique first best tool vector and a corresponding
optimal team, G∗(n). If b is sufficiently close to one then the following hold for G∗(n) in the
simultaneous tool choice game.
(i) The first best tool vector, chosen by the corresponding experts, is supported by a strict Nash
equilibrium of this game.
(ii) The payoffs in this equilibrium strictly Pareto dominate the payoffs produced by any other
tool vector.
Collective interest overcomes the incentives to duplicate tool choices but it need not solve
coordination problems. For example, suppose that there exist n problem solvers who all have
approximately equal skill with each of n tools. There exists a large set of cases in which the
optimal solution calls for each problem solver to choose a unique tool. However, if there exist
any private incentives, each problem solver would like to choose the best tool. This game has
n! possible equilibria. Coordination would be difficult. And even if coordination occurs, these
equilibria may be Pareto ranked. For example, one type of problem solver might be better
at applying tool j but choose tool k, while another type, which is better at applying k, could











t choose tool j. Making decentralized tool choice sequential and assuming subgame perfectionrules out these inefficient equilibria.
Sequential Tool Choice
Under sequential tool choice, the manager stipulates the order in which members of the team
select the tools that they will try in stage two. These choices are common knowledge and
irreversible. Hence in stage one the manager can accurately forecast the equilibrium behavior
of her subordinates. The fundamental problem that sequential choice can solve is that of co-
ordination failure. We consider two types of coordination failure categorized by the degree of
conflict. The easier one, which we analyze first, involves ‘pure’ coordination failures: the equi-
libria are Pareto-ordered and the manager wants to avoid the perverse outcome of a dominated
equilibrium (the setting of Remark 2).
Corollary 3: Suppose that tool choice is sequential and that otherwise the assumptions of
Remark 2 hold. Then the first best tool vector is realized in equilibrium.
Thus, when tool choice is sequential and team members are mostly oriented toward group-
success, Pareto-dominated outcomes cannot occur.
The second type of coordination failure involves multiple equilibria which cannot be Pareto-
ordered. In this context the individuals disagree as to which equilibrium should be played:
individual incentives are strong enough to make members of the team want to play more
promising tools, leaving their teammates with the burden of trying less promising tools. For
example, consider a group with two members: an s1 and an s2, the respective experts on t1
and t2, the two most promising tools. Each type can use either tool. There are two pure
Nash equilibria: in one, s1 tries t1 and s2 tries t2; in the other, each specialist tries the other
type’s tool. Because t1 is considerably more likely to solve the problem, each type prefers the
equilibrium in which s/he tries t1. The manager, of course, wants each tool to be selected by
its expert. Sequential tool choice secures this: the manager tells s1 to choose first, s1 picks t1,
forcing s2 to select t2. Sequential choice creates a game with a first-mover advantage which
can be used by the manager to maximize the probability of solving the problem.18 (See Bendor
and Page [2016, Proposition 7] for a generalization of this example to groups of arbitrary size.)
Of course this procedure cannot work if private incentives so powerful that each type has
a dominant strategy of picking t1. In such circumstances the choice-sequence is irrelevant.
Hence the ability of the manager to stipulate the order of tool-selection has the most value for
18Recall that if the parent wants the children to implement the fair (i.e., equal) split then she tells one child
to cut the cookie and the second to select a piece. If the children’s utility is strictly increasing in the size of
their piece then in the unique equilibrium the cutter divides the cookie in half. The manager in our model has
substantively different preferences but her exploitation of the conflict among the individuals is similar to the
parent’s exploiting the children’s conflict over the cookie.











t intermediate levels of conflict among teammates. If there is little conflict—b is close to one—then multiple equilibria will be Pareto-ordered. This is not a difficult coordination problem;self-organizing groups should be able to handle such issues. On the other hand, extreme
congestion problems arise if there are strong private incentives to solve the problem. Every
agent has the same dominant strategy to apply its best tool. In these cases, sequencing tool
choices is ineffective; only centralized tool-selection produces the first-best solution.
Regularity Properties in Strategic Tool Choice
Strategic tool choice requires more stringent assumptions to ensure that the regularity proper-
ties hold (see figure 4). We confine attention to sequential tool choice and consider only pure
strategy equilibria. The next proposition covers all five regularity properties. Comparing these
results with centralized tool choice (proposition 2) reveals that the final three properties are
much weaker while the first two are unchanged.












L = Competency Loading
O = Competency Ordering
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Figure 4: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Regularity Properties: Strategic Tool Choice
Proposition 7: Under sequential strategic tool choice, optimal groups
(i) Can violate competency loading for any kind of tool overlap.
(ii) Satisfy competency ordering if and only if each type is expert at its best tool (B2).
(iii) Can violate no dominated types for any kind of tool overlap.
(iv) Can violate monotonicity for any kind of tool overlap.
(v) Satisfy asymptotic diversity if and only if each type has exclusive best tools (B1).
Competency loading fails in the strategic setting for the same reason that it fails under cen-
tralized tool choice: an effective tool (one with a high p) may be easy to apply (its expert’s h
is high), making intra-tool redundancy unnecessary. Competency ordering again holds so long
as each type is the expert at its best tool. The logic is identical to that of centralized tool
choice. If a type is the expert at its best tool then the best tools of more able types are more
promising. The corresponding specialists should be hired earlier than types that are experts
of inferior tools.
The conclusions about competency loading and competency ordering hold regardless of whether
individuals care primarily about team success (high b) or personal gain (low b). Indeed, the
results hold even if b varies arbitrarily across types. The relative unimportance of private
incentives underscores the power of non-overlapping toolkits and of the importance of the
distribution of skills across types.
Strategic tool choice flips the result about hiring dominated types. This finding rests on the
possibility that a dominated type creates fewer strategic problems. Suppose, for example, that
type s1 is perfect at applying tool t1 and can apply tool t2 correctly half the time. Suppose that
an s2 type can apply both tools correctly slightly less than half the time; hence s1 dominates
s2. For a large class of parameter values, a team of two s1’s will both choose tool t1 whereas
a diverse team will choose both tools. Thus the (s1, s2) team will outperform the team of two
s1’s.











t This example illustrates how the manager can tap the strategic comparative advantage of adominated type. If the s1 type is extremely good at t1 then that specialist may be unableto credibly commit in stage one to selecting t2 in stage two. In contrast, if s2’s comparative
advantage in t2, relative to her skill in t1, is sufficiently strong then the manager knows that
it is a best response for an s2 to follow through on a promise to try t2. Thus, although that
type has no absolute advantage with any tool, it has a strategic comparative advantage at an
inferior tool—the problem solving version of Ricardo’s insight.
As an index of the dominated type’s comparative advantage in tool t2 we use θs2(t2) =
1 − hs2 (t1)hs2 (t2) . This index is positive if s2 has any comparative advantage in tool t2 (i.e., if
hs2(t2) > hs2(t1)) and reaches its maximum value of one if s2 is completely feckless at t1. This
strategic comparative advantage can be useful to the manager even when the inferior type, s2,
is completely dominated by s1. This strong sense of skill-domination is defined below.
Definition: Type si completely dominates sj if T (sj) ⊆ T (si) and min{hsi(tk)|tk ∈ T (si)} >
max{hsj (tl)|tl ∈ T (sj)}.
Complete domination is about as clear a skill-difference as can be imagined: si is better at
everything in its toolkit than sj is at anything in its repertoire. (This is a special kind of
pairwise domination, which in turn is nested inside ordinary domination.) Recall that under
centralized tool choice a rational manager never selects a type that is dominated in any way,
e.g., even if domination requires all other types. In contrast, under strategic choice she may
hire a completely dominated one.
Remark 3: Suppose there are two types and s1 completely dominates s2. The best tool of s1
is t1 and s2’s best tool is t2. If tool choice is strategic then there exists a vector of parameter
thresholds {b∗ > 0, h∗ < 1, θ∗ < 1, p∗ > 0} such that if b < b∗, hs1(t1) > h∗, θs2(t2) > θ∗, and
p(t2) < p
∗ then (a) the optimal two-person group is (s1, s2) and (b) in its unique equilibrium
in stage two each type picks its best tool.
As is often the case, the manager’s quest here is for tool diversity, and if this won’t be imple-
mented in the Nash equilibrium of a homogeneous team of the most able type then in some
parametric regions it is worthwhile to accept a dominated worker in order to attain tool di-
versity.19 Next, we show how monotonicity can fail for any overlap, including the case of No
Overlap (B0). The violation arises because as groups grow larger, private benefits decrease:
the glory of solving the problem will likely be shared by several teammates. This weakens the
incentives for choosing a unique, less effective tool, having the same effect as increasing b, the
collective benefit.
19Note that here s2 is dominated by just one type. If it were dominated by a set of other types then the
Ricardian property need not hold. Suppose, for example, that s2 is a jack-of-all-trades: worse than s1 regarding
t1 but better on t2, and worse than some third type, s3, regarding t2 but better on t1. Here s2 is dominated
by the combination of s1 and s3. This feature could rob s2 of its strategic comparative advantage in t2: if s3 is
sufficiently bad at t1 then his promise to try t2 will be credible. Thus a team of (s1, s3) will deliver tool diversity
in equilibrium and the manager will get what she wants without putting a dominated type on the team.











t Asymptotic diversity violations also require that a type’s best tool not be unique. The proof,though technically involved, relies on a straightforward construction. Suppose there are threetypes and two tools. Assume that the best type can apply the better tool correctly with
probability one, the second type can correctly deploy the better tool and a lesser tool with
probability h < 1, and the third type has only the inferior tool in his repertoire. Further,
suppose that the second type is marginally more capable with the lesser tool than is the third
type. When the private benefits for solving the problem are large, the second type will choose
the better tool when added to a team of one person. Thus, the third type is a more valuable
addition to that group. The asymptotic result relies on similar logic.
We conclude this section by stating an analog of our previous result for centralized tool choice
relating the potential loss from hiring rules based on ability, diversity, or the combination of
diversity and ability.
Remark 4: Under sequential tool choice, hiring by diversity can produce marginally worthless
hires even when toolkits do not overlap. Hiring by ability or ability and diversity can produce
marginally worthless hires unless experts at best tools (B2) holds.
This claim relies on the same logic as in the centralized case. Using diversity alone can lead
to poor outcomes because team performance depends on the tools applied, not on the set of
potential tools. Balancing ability and diversity can also produce worthless hires when problem
solvers are not experts at best tools because as we have seen, a high ability problem solver
might fail to choose a new tool.
If, however, each person brings different expertise to the table then overlap will not arise. We
consider that case next.
Experts and the Opportunity Costs of Expertise
It is well-known that it takes many years and much effort to become highly proficient in
chess, cryptography, physics, and other informationally-intensive domains (Ericsson et al 1993;
Feltovich et al 2006). Indeed, it is generally believed that it is impossible to become a top notch
expert in such fields without thousands of hours of intense study and practice. (How much is
training versus real experience varies across domains and over time—e.g., ‘book learning’ in
medicine has greatly increased over the last century—but the total number of necessary hours
is both high and not all that variable across informationally-intensive domains.) This last
section incorporates that robust empirical regularity by making an assumption that reflects
the temporal opportunity cost of expertise: in modern economies, everybody faces a time
budget that binds. In the context of our framework, that means, roughly speaking, that a
type can become proficient in only a few tools. Hence candidates for the team might be either
specialists, who are good at a few tools, or generalists, who are mediocre at many.
To derive the formal conditions necessary for this to hold, we say that type sj is highly spe-
cialized if (1) it is the expert at some tool, say tj , and (2) for all other tk ∈ T (sj), there is a











t small but strictly positive εsj such that hsj (tk) < εj for all k 6= j. We assume, of course, thatεsj < h?sk(tk), the skill-level of the expert at tk; thus a highly specialized type is an expert atonly one tool. If becoming an expert is time-consuming then everyone in an optimal group
will be highly specialized. This result holds for both simultaneous and sequential games.
Remark 5: We assume a group of a fixed size, n. If all experts are highly specialized and
none is perfect at applying any tool then everyone in any optimal group of size n is highly
specialized. If in addition b < 1 then for any optimal group, G∗(n), there exists an ε > 0 such
that if max{hsi(tj)} < ε for every tj ∈ T (si) which isn’t si’s best tool, then everybody in G∗(n)
has a strictly dominant strategy of selecting his best tool and the tool vector produced by the
corresponding unique Nash equilibrium is the first-best.
Thus, this high degree of skill-specialization delivers just what the manager wants: problem-
solving effectiveness and clean strategic properties. The former is easy to see: in general the
first-best tool vector is produced only by experts and Remark 5 assumes that all experts are
highly specialized, so this part of what the manager wants follows immediately.20 The strategic
benefits of skill-specialization are a bit more subtle. It helps to examine the limiting case in
which experts are completely feckless with everything in their repertoire that isn’t their best
tool. (Technically this special case is excluded from the feasible set because it means that
hsj (tk) = 0 for all k 6= j and we assume throughout that hsi(·) is strictly positive for all i,
but it is a useful limiting case.) In this circumstance an expert has no chance of solving the
problem with anything other than his best tool, so trying that tool is obviously a dominant
strategy for every expert for any composition of G(n); eliminating the knife-edge case of b = 1
ensures that selecting one’s best tool is strictly dominant.
We can see the strategic advantage of hiring only experts from a somewhat different angle by
re-using the idea of strategic comparative advantage introduced earlier. Remark 3 showed that
the manager may find it worthwhile to put a dominated type on the team if that type enjoys
a strategic comparative advantage in a tool that the manager wants the group to try. In the
context of Remark 5, however, only experts enjoy strategic comparative advantage. This is a
direct effect of their being highly specialized: since experts are inept at anything that isn’t
their speciality they have a comparative advantage only with their best tool, which is exactly
what the manager wants the experts to use. All strategic coordination problems disappear.
Remark 5 implies that if the first best tool vector is completely diverse then so is the optimal
team. In such circumstances tool diversity and team diversity are linked. Nevertheless, compe-
tency loading can still be violated: a less promising tool, say tk, might be more difficult to apply
than a more promising one, tj , hence there may be more tk experts on the team than tj special-
ists. It is straightforward to show that the other four regularity hiring properties—competency
20Remark 5 does not presume complete skill specialization; there can be generalists in the set of types. But
every generalist-type is dominated by the set of experts whose repertoires collectively span that generalist’s
toolkit.











t ordering, monotonicity, no dominated hires, and asymptotic diversity—will satisfied in strate-gic tool choice under the assumptions of Remark 5. Hence we might regard this result asidentifying a set of conditions that make the manager’s hiring problem a ‘nice’ one.
Extensions: Partial Solutions, Multiple Tools, and Uncertainty
Our framework makes three strong assumptions. First, we do not allow for the possibility that
a tool is a partial solution. In some cases, one tool might solve a part of a problem while a
second tool solves the remainder. Second, we assume that a problem solver applies a single
tool. In practice, a problem solver might apply several. Third, we assume that in stage one
the manager knows what problem will confront the team in stage two. Sometimes, however,
more than one problem may arise and a manager is uncertain which it will be. In this section,
we describe how our model can be extended to account for all three possibilities.
Consider the following sketch of a model that allows for partial solutions. We first assume that
each problem has two parts, denoted by “/” and “\” which together form an X. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that if a problem solver applies a tool correctly on one part then she
applies it correctly on all parts. We can then rewrite the probability that type si solves the
problem using tool tk as hsi(tk) · p/(tk) · p\(tk), where p/(tk) and p\(tk) correspond to the
probabilities of solving the two parts of the problem, given that the tool was applied correctly.
The probability that two problem solvers, si and sj , who apply tool tk solve the problem equals
the probability that at least one of them correctly applies the tool and that the tool solves
both parts of the problem:
[hsi(tk) + hsj (tk)− hsi(tk) · hsj (tk)]p/(tk) · p\(tk)
In contrast, the probability that two problem solvers, si and sj , who apply tools tk and tk′
respectively, solve the problem equals the sum of probabilities that each solves it on their own
minus the probability that both solve it plus the two cases where each solves a different part
of the problem.
[hsi(tk)p(tk)+hsj (tk′)p(tk′)−hsi(tk)p(tk)·hsj (tk′)p(tk′)]+hsi(tk)·hsj (tk′)[p/(tk)·p\(tk′)+p\(tk)·p/(tk′)]
The possibility that each tool solves a different part confers an advantage to groups that apply
diverse tools. This benefit from diversity is the main effect of allowing partial solutions.21 A
straightforward argument shows that because success requires only that at least one tool solve
each part, increasing the number of parts makes more tools even more advantageous. Thus,
21That advantage exists even if we assume that problem solvers might apply tools correctly to only a part of
a problem.











t decomposability (Simon 1962) and diversity (Hong and Page 2004; Page 2008) appear to becomplements.A second question is how the potential for multiple solutions influences incentives. Notice first
that if tool kits do not overlap, partial solutions have no effect other than to make weaker tools
more promising at the margin. Some incentive problems would be attenuated. For example,
the second member of a type who has skill with two tools would have a stronger incentive to
choose the inferior tool. In cases where the better tool has a higher probability of success on
one part of the problem and the weaker tool has a higher probability on the remainder, the
incentives for the second member of the type added to the group would be clear: choose the
inferior tool.
None of this implies that allowing for partial solutions overcomes all incentive problems.
Rather, it shifts the range of parameters for which incentive problems arise. The potential
for violations of monotonicity and of no dominated types still exists. The only difference is
that with partial solutions, tools with even lower probabilities of success should be applied to
problems.
Including the possibility that a type can apply multiple tools requires assumptions about the
number of tools applied. If a type applies all its tools then no dominated type would ever be
hired. If a type can apply at most K tools, then the assumption has no effect unless types
overlap in their tools. Accordingly, violations of competency loading, monotonicity, and no
dominated types would still arise.
If we fix the number of tools that a type can apply, the same kinds of incentive problems arise
as in the single tool case. For instance, suppose that at most three tools can be applied by
any problem solver and that type s1 has skill with tools t1, t2, t3, and t4. A second type s1 on
the team would face a choice between applying any of the four sets consisting of three tools.
Among these, the sets {t1, t2, t3} and {t1, t2, t4} have the highest individual success rate. If
type s1 is a virtuoso with tools t1 and t2, the choice between these two sets for the second type
s1 is equivalent to choice between t3 and t4 when two other problem solvers apply tools t1 and
t2 and third agent applies t3.
Using similar constructions, the arguments used for single tools carry over to the multiple tool
setting with one important caveat. Now, those proofs require particular assumptions on tool
overlap. More importantly, if types can apply multiple tools then a type’s skill with multiple
tools becomes more valuable. Paradoxically, a type with skill at a single, novel tool may be
hired earlier because other tools will be more likely to have been applied correctly.
Third, the manager may not know for certain in stage one which problem will confront the
team in stage two. The simplest version of this extension would presume an exogenously
fixed probability distribution over a set of possible problems and zero conflict within the team
(b = 1).22 In such a setting it is intuitive that problem uncertainty will increase the value of
22In more complex versions some of the problems would be profitable opportunities discovered by enterprising











t tool diversity, as the optimal mix of tools will typically be state (i.e., problem) contingent andin stage one the manager doesn’t know which state will arise in stage two. Further, we suspectthat the existence of unlikely but dangerous problems—a fire in an oil refinery; an earthquake
in a populous area—heightens the tension between ability, as measured by skill with tools
that are likely to be needed, and diversity. Indeed, when it is difficult to identify (diagnose)
problems—is this an X or a Y ?—it may be optimal to include dominated generalists on the
team even when there are no issues of credible commitment.23 Finally, if the set of possible
problems is very large then long-standing issues of organizational boundaries (Williamson 1975)
can arise. When maintaining optimal diversity inside the firm is too expensive then it will be
outsourced. This in turn will generate interesting contracting issues.
Our main findings hold in all three extensions. Optimal groups must balance ability, as mea-
sured by skill with the most promising tools, and diversity, as measured by skill with unique
tools. In addition, in some situations the manager has incentives to take unconventional ac-
tions, such as hire dominated types (because they are more likely to apply high margin tools)
or violate monotonicity (because increasing team size changes the private benefit from solving
the problem).
Discussion
In this paper we construct a framework to analyze team problem solving under centralized
and decentralized tool choice. Our main results can be grouped into four sets. First, we
characterize optimal team composition. That result reveals the direct benefits from diverse
tools. In highlighting the importance of applying diverse tools, our main findings align with
a growing empirical literature on cognitive diversity and problem solving in organizations
(Wuchty et al 2007), crowds (Lakhani and Jepperson 2007, Jepperson and Lakhani 2010),
academic publishing (Jones, et al 2008, Uzzi et al 2013), and team-based IQs (Bachrach et al
2012). These studies consider nearly every academic paper ever published and find positive
correlation between diversity, measured by email address, and impact and citations (Freeman
and Huang 2014). Deeper dives into smaller samples find a significant contribution of diversity
as captured by references to atypical literatures—a crude proxy for our diverse tools (Shi 2009,
Schilling and Green 2011).
Second, we show that if a manager can control tool choice then optimal groups never include
dominated types but they must satisfy asymptotic diversity. If we further assume specialists to
be the best at their best tools then optimal groups also satisfy competency ordering; since we
assume that each tool has a unique expert, monotonicity holds as well. However, competency
managers (Hsieh et al 2007) and hence endogenous.
23We suspect, however, that only strategic problems can prompt a rational manager to hire a type that is
pairwise dominated. A type that is dominated though not pairwise so can be a useful jack-of-all-trades in a
small problem solving team that is unsure what problem it will face; one that is pairwise dominated lacks this
decision theoretic justification.











t loading—better types are more numerous— need not be satisfied, and in fact rarely holds inoptimal groups. Together, these results imply that project managers with tool assignmentauthority seeking to build optimal groups can abide by some, though not all, of a standard set
of hiring practices.
Our third set of results characterize properties of the Nash equilibria in the strategic tool
selection game. These results underpin the fourth set which show that the above regularities
do not hold when the manager selects team members but lacks the authority or information
necessary to assign tools. In those cases, optimal groups can and typically will violate all of
the standard properties. True, competency ordering—better types are hired earlier—holds if
types are experts at their best tools, and asymptotic diversity holds if each type has Exclusive
Best Tools. But apart from those special cases, none of the conventional hiring rules (e.g., hire
the best) apply.
These third and fourth sets of results apply to environments in which the manager does not
or perhaps cannot know the tools a worker applies. Given the difficulties that can arise from
strategic tool choice, one might then think that organizations should not allow problem solvers
the freedom to choose tools. Such a policy would require the manager to possess deep and
accurate knowledge of workers’ repertoires and skill levels and knowledge of the efficacy of
different tools for the problem at hand. This may be unlikely. Empirical studies of this type of
environment reveal a tendency toward hiring people with general skills (Lazear 2009), i.e., lots
of tools. Our model suggests a possible flaw in that approach. Generalists will have incentives
to choose their best tools, which may overlap across types. If the manager cannot dictate
which tools are tried, the firm may prefer specialists who create fewer coordination problems
regarding tool choice.
A manager could, of course, ignore the possibility of unorthodox solutions and stick with the
standard rules despite knowing that doing so could produce suboptimal groups. That strategy
would be practical if the violations produced modest inefficiencies—if they were nearly efficient.
We show, however, that things can be much worse than that: hiring by ability, hiring by
diversity, and even hiring by both diversity and ability can produce hires that are worthless
at the margin. Thus, a manager should design groups via the more combinatoric tool-based
approach described here. This approach may entail non-traditional hiring practices: e.g.,
putting a specialist with a dominated set of skills on the team, removing previously hired
workers, and so on.
When modeling strategic tool choice we have assumed both individual and collective incentives.
If a manager can weaken individual incentives, be they financial or reputational, she reduces
the coordination problems. However, because tool choice is discrete, coordination failure may
persist even when individual incentives are weak. Recall also that coordination failure can arise
because a team member’s actions can affect other agents’ incentives. When a new problem
solver successfully applies a tool that nobody on the existing team has correctly applied, the











t probability of solving the problem increases. That increased probability boosts the incentivesfor existing team members to choose better tools even if someone else on the team is also usingthat tool rather than unique tools. This dampens diversity and reduces the value of the new
tool.
We also discuss three extensions. The first allows for partial solutions. The second enables
individuals to apply multiple tools. The third allows for the possibility that the manager
is uncertain which problem will confront the team. None of these extensions qualitatively
changes our results. In yet another extension one could allow individuals to differ in their
capacity to apply tools. Problem solvers with greater capacity could apply more tools and
would have higher measured ability. This extension would tilt the results in favor of higher
capacity individuals but would not negate diversity’s value. Diversity would contribute to team
performance so long as the set of tools relevant to a task exceeds the repertoire of any one
person.
In addition to their applications to hiring and staffing within firms, our findings have impli-
cations for crowdsourcing, i.e., presenting a problem to many problem solvers who need not
belong to the organization. Managers have little to no control over the tools used by a crowd.
As a crowd becomes larger, individuals pursuing a private reward have greater incentive to
try more promising tools, attenuating the increase in crowd effectiveness as a function of size.
If participation is costly, individuals should also be less likely to join larger crowds (Terwi-
esch and Xu 2008). On the other hand, for problems that might be solved by many different
tools, the effect of the participation cost would be smaller. This logic aligns with the finding of
Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani (2011) that the free rider problem is less pronounced in more
uncertain domains where the appropriate tool kits are larger. Relatedly, for organizations that
do both in-house research and solicit the advice of outsiders (i.e., external crowdsourcing), the
crowd’s presence could induce in-house researchers to use more promising tools.
In sum, our framework allows us to unpack the contributions of individual ability and collective
diversity in problem solving and to characterize the incentive problems that arise in tool choice.
We find that the potential for unconventional solutions is generally less when toolkits are
disjoint, implying a strategic benefit from specialized expertise as well as the direct problem-
solving benefit of diversity.
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Proof of Observation 1: The formal proof relies on Proposition 1 which states that the optimal
addition to a given group G is the type si that maximizes





By assumption, type hs1(tk) ≥ hsi(tk) for all si. The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 1: To prove part (i), note first that the conclusion holds if max{hsj′ (tk)} = 0
because in that case sj′ is completely worthless whereas P
+(si, G) is strictly positive. Since P
+(si, G)
must continue to exceed P+(sj′ , G) if j
′’s skill at using any tool in his toolkit is sufficiently close to
zero, the result follows. To prove part (ii) construct a G′ such that for every tk ∈ T (si) there is a pure
specialist in G′, i.e., some type sk for which T (sk) = {tk}. If hsk(tk) = 1 for all such pure specialists
then si is completely worthless to G
′ because every tool that si possesses will be tested with probability
one by this group. Hence if the hsk(tk)’s are sufficiently close to one then P
+(si, G
′), though strictly
positive, can be arbitrarily close to zero, whence P+(sj , G
′) > P+(si, G
′).
Proof of Proposition 2: Parts (i) and (ii) are proved in the text. Here we prove the other three
parts. We start with (iii). Under centralized tool choice, the manager can assign any member of the
group a specific tool. Therefore, if the manager hires a type sj and assigns it tool tk, then sj must be
best at applying tool tk. This proves (iii).
The proof of (iv) is by contradiction. Suppose there is some group size, n†, when the manager will
for the first time kick out a type, say si, whom she hired earlier. Let us use n
∗ to label the smaller
group-size at which the manager (1) added an si to the group and (2) for sizes n
∗ + 1, . . . , n† − 1 she
did not add any si’s to the group. Suppose that for |G| = n∗ the manager tells the next type hired, si
to use tool tk. The pair, (si, tk), must satisfy the optimality condition of Proposition 2. (Proposition 2
immediately implies that si must be the expert of tk; otherwise, the planned pair of (si, tk) would not
be optimal for |G| = n∗. By assumption, for |G| = n† the manager removes the si hired at |G| = n∗,
replacing him with (say) sj . Because si is the expert at tk, the manager must be planning to tell the
new member, sj , to try some other tool, say t`. Hence, for |G| = n† it must be true that the pair (sj , t`)
increases the probability of group success more than does the (si, tk) pair.
But if this is true for |G| = n† then it must have been true for |G| = n∗. Given that si is the expert at
tk, none of the other types added in-between n
∗ and n† are using tools tk. Hence the probability that
tk will be tested by the group is unchanged from |G| = n∗ to n†. In contrast, the probability that t`
will be tested by the group may have gone up, if a sj has been added in that interim and the manager
plans to order that sj try t`. Or the test-probability is unchanged, if no (sj , t`) pair has been added in
the interim. In either case, given that the probabilities of different tools are succeeding are independent
of each other, if the marginal contribution of (sj , t`) exceeds that of (si, tk) for |G| = n† then the same
strict inequality must have held when |G| = n∗. But then the choice of si given the group-size of n∗
would not have been optimal after all, and we have a contradiction.
To prove (v), we first note that if tk is a new tool, then a straightforward argument shows that the
manager assigns the same tools to the existing members of G after a problem solving using tool tk is
added to G. Given a type si and a tool t
∗
si that has been assigned to the group, the increase in the

















si). This converges to
zero as the number of type si’s using tool t
∗
si increases. In contrast, given there exists a finite number
of tools and none solves the problem with probability one, the increase in the probability of solving the
problem given a type sj who is best at tool tk which is not used by G equals Pr[G(FAIL] · hsj (tk)p(tk),
which is strictly positive.
Proof of Remark 1: The proof is by construction. Assume that tool t1 solves the problem with
probability 0.8 and t2 solves it with probability 0.2 and that tool t3 solves the problem with probability
ε. Suppose that G consists of one specialist who always possesses tool t1 and one specialist who possess
tool t2 with can correctly apply that tool half the time. Thus, G solves the problem with probability
0.8 + (0.2)(0.1) = 0.82. Assume that type si applies tool t1 with hsi(t1) = 0.15 and tool t3 with
probability hsi(t3) =
0.07
0.18 and that type sj is a specialist who applies tool t2 with hsj (t2) = 0.4. By
construction type si has an ability of 0.15 and is more diverse that type sj , which has an ability of 0.08.
The manager will assign si tool t3, so the probability that G and si solve the problem equals:
0.82 + (0.18) · 0.007
0.18
· ε = 0.82 + 0.007ε
The manager will assign sj tool t2, so the probability that G and sj solve the problem equals
0.8 + 0.2[(0.5)(0.2) + (0.5)(0.4)(0.2)] = 0.828
Thus, P+(si, G) = 0.07ε and P
+(sj , G) = 0.08. Note that this example requires that type si is not best
at its best tool. If both types are best at their best tools then hiring by ability will be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3: Follows from Nash (1951). Choose a type si and assume any set of strategies
by the individuals of the other types. This can be thought of as the environment for the individuals of
type si. By Nash (1951), individuals of type si have a symmetric best response. Therefore, a symmetric
equilibrium exists. To prove the second part of the proposition, recall that pk ≥ pk′ . In a symmetric
by type equilibrium, the payoff from choosing tool tk and tool k
′ must be equal. Assume there exist
Ñ+1 individuals of a given type, and suppose that the remaining Ñ individuals play the mixed strategy
equilibrium. Conditional on rk of those individuals choosing tool tk and rk′ choosing tool k + 1, let
ρi(`) denote the probability that i of the ` individuals not choosing tool tk or tool tk′ individuals solve
the problem. These individuals need not be of this same type. Further let q̂ = (1 − qtk − qtk′ ) The
payoff from choosing tool tk, πk(~q) can be written as follows:































































































The fourth term subtracts off the case where no one chose tool k′ and none of the other tools solves
the problem. The expression for the payoff from playing k′ can be written similarly. It follows that the
payoff from choosing tool tk equals the payoff from choosing took k































































































Which can be simplified as:





































































































































implies qtk > qtk′ . We will show that qtk < qtk′ implies the opposite inequality. Suppose that qtk < qtk′ .
The right most term of the first expression will then exceed the rightmost term of the second expression.




































1 + rk′ + i
)
Notice that the values of rk and rk′ both range from 0 to Ñ . Therefore, the comparison depends on
the relative weights assigned to each term. Given qtk < qtk′ , the values of rk′ are biased towards higher
values, completing the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2: Let z denote the number of problem solvers of some other type other than si or
the new type who solve the problem. We show that the result holds for any z. The assumption of non
overlapping toolkits implies additive separability of the payoff function for any one type as a function
of the number of problem solvers of another type who solve the problem. Therefore, if the result holds
for any one z, it also holds for a probability distribution over z.
The formal proof relies on lemma 1 stated below. Assume that there exists Ñ individuals of type si,
who choose tools tk and tk′ with probabilities qsi(tk) and qsi(tk′) such that qsi(tk) > qsi(tk′). Define
the difference in the probabilities of exactly ` winners, Dsi,`(tk′,tk), to be probability that exactly ` of













the si’s choose tool tk′ times the probability that tool tk′ was successfully applied by a single type si
problem solver and tool tk′ solved the problem, minus the probability that exactly ` of the si’s choose
tk. times the probability that tool tk was successfully applied by a single type si problem solver and
tool tk successfully solved the problem.
Lemma 1. Given qsi(tk) > qsi(tk′), there exists an `
′ such that for any ` ≤ `′, Dsi,`(tk′ , tk) ≥ 0 and
for any ` ≥ `′, Dsi,`(tk′ , tk) ≤ 0












q`tk′ (1− qtk′ )
(Ñ−`). The latter exceeds










Given qsi(tk) > qsi(tk′), it follows that there exists and `
′ such that the left hand side exceeds the
right hand side if and only if ` ≤ `′. The result will still hold if we multiply the left hand side of the
inequality by a constant, though the value of `′ may change. Let that constant equal pk′hik′pkhik . We can
write Dsi,`(tk′ , tk) as follows









(Ñ−`) − pkhikpkhikq`tk(1− qtk)
(Ñ−`)
)
This completes the proof of the lemma. To prove the corollary, assume Ñ problem solvers of type si.
Take the actions of Ñ − 1 of those problems solvers as given according to a symmetric by type mixed
strategy equilibrium ~q∗(G). Let Q`tk denote the probability that exactly ` of Ñ − 1 type si problem
solvers choose tool tk in equilibrium. Note that expected payoff to a type si conditional on using
tool tk when exactly ` − 1 other type si problem solver use tool tk equals 1 + bZ+` Consider the tool
choice by the Ñth problem solver of type si. If tools tk and tk′ are used in equilibrium with strictly
positive probability by type si, then each must have the same expected value. Let Pr(G \ si, X) equal















Recall that if there exists no overlap then pk > pk′ implies that that q
∗
tk




by lemma 1 there exists an `′ such that for any ` ≤ `′, Dsi,`(tk′ , tk) ≤ 0 and for any ` ≥ `′, Dsi,`(tk′ , tk) ≥
0, where Dsi,`(tk, tk′) equals the probability that exactly ` problem solvers use tool tk′ and a single
problem solver of type si successfully applies tool tk′ minus the probability that exactly ` use tool tk a





























If we add a problem solver that uses non overlapping tools, and if that problem solver does not solve the
problem, then there is no effect on the payoffs from playing either tool. However, if the new problem
solver solves the problem then the left hand side of the equation becomes zero because the problem is









To simplify notation let w` = Dsi,`(tk′ , tk). By assumption w` > 0 off ` ≤ `′. Therefore, we can write













Given this inequality and given the signs on the w′`, the following inequality holds because the decrease











Z + 1 + `
)
Notice that these payoffs correspond to exactly one more individual solving the problem. This inequality
therefore implies that the expected payoff from choosing tool tk strictly exceeds that of playing tool tk′ ,
so that in equilibrium tk must be played with strictly higher probability.
Proof of Proposition 4: Given that s1 dominates all the other types, by Proposition 1 the optimal
group must consist only of the best type. Hence any group which contains any type other than s1 is
suboptimal. Hence such a group cannot implement the first best outcome, thus establishing part (b) of
the result.
In contrast, we now show that all Nash equilibria of the homogeneous s1 group achieve the first best
tool vector. (For convenience we assume it to be unique; the proof extends in a straightforward but
tedious way to the case of multiple first best tool vectors.) Call this vector, which the manager would
select under centralized tool choice, T ∗. Consider any vector T • 6= T ∗. We need to show that any such
T • is not an equilibrium under decentralized tool choice by the homogeneous group of the best type.
To do this we initially assume that b is exactly equal to one; this will be relaxed below.
Either T • has gaps (a more promising tool, tj , isn’t selected by anyone but a less promising tool, tk, is)
or it doesn’t. If it does have gaps then clearly T • cannot be an equilibrium because the agent picking
tk would increase the probability of group success, P (G), and therefore his payoff, by switching from tk
to tj .
So now consider a T • without gaps. We need to show that despite this similarity with T ∗ (which the
manager would obviously design to be gapless), this kind of T • is not an equilibrium either. Since
T • 6= T ∗, there must be at least one tool, say tj , which has too many agents selecting it, and hence
some other tool, say tk, which has too few: P (G) would rise if one agent (possibly more) moved from
the former to the latterer. But given that b = 1, agents care only about group success, so if agent would
increase P (G) by switching from tk to j then playing the former isn’t a best response to the choices of













the other n− 1 agents: Hence T • is not an equilibrium.
The above logic continues to hold if b is sufficiently close to one. And since there are finitely many T •’s,
there exists a b < 1 such that any b > b is sufficiently close to one for all of them. This establishes part
(a).
Proof of Proposition 5: By Proposition 3, an optimal group must satisfy competency ordering. To
complete the identification of the first best outcome, we initially assume that min(hsi(t
∗(si))) exactly
equals one. Given this, it is obviously suboptimal to have any type’s best tool selected by more than
one member of the group. Further, it is inefficient to overlook any best tool. More precisely, it is
suboptimal if in any group there is some tool, tj , that isn’t selected even though it is the best tool
of some type (say sj) while some other tool, tk, is selected even though it is not the best tool of any
type. This holds because best tools are more promising than the other tools: i.e., hsjp(tj) > hskp(tk),
where sj and sk are the experts at deploying tj and tk, respectively. Finally, best tools are exclusive,
so if the manager wants some best tool, say tj , selected in stage two then she must put its expert, sj ,
on the team in stage one. Together, these properties imply that if G(n) is no bigger than the number
of types then the manager’s design problem under centralized tool choice is simple: in stage one she
selects the n most able types and in stage two she tells each one to try his best tool. And since this
design is strictly better than any other design when min(hsi(t
∗(si))) is exactly one, it continues to hold
if min(hsi(t
∗(si))) is sufficiently close to one.
Turning now to strategic tool choice, consider a group G of size n which the manager in stage one stocked
with the n most able types. (The proof is trivial for n = 1 so assume that n > 1.) Each type’s best
tool is exclusive. This implies that for all b ≥ 0, each agent has a strictly dominant strategy of selecting
his best tool, t∗(si). Hence G produces a unique Nash equilibrium in which every member of the group
plays his strictly dominant strategy, i.e., tries his best tool. But this is exactly the description of G and
its unique tool-selection equilibrium: everyone in G is of a different type; G satisfies the property of no
competency skipping; in equilibrium everyone tries his (exclusive) best tool. Thus this Nash equilibrium
implements the first-best outcome, establishing part (a) of the result.
Finally, consider any group G′ 6= G. We now show that any such G′ cannot generate the first best tool
vector. Either G′ satisfies competency ordering or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t then it follows immediately
from Proposition 2 that G′ is suboptimal and hence cannot implement the first best outcome in any
tool vector.
Alternatively, G′ does satisfy competency ordering. Either each type is a singleton in the group or it
isn’t. If each type is a singleton then G′ is, in fact, G, so there’s nothing to compare. Alternatively,
there is at least one type, say si, with multiple members in the group. But this is not the optimal G
∗(n)
identified in paragraph one of this proof, thus establishing part (b).
Proof of Proposition 6: We prove each part in turn.
(i) We use contradiction to prove that all problem solvers of the same type pick the same tool. Suppose
instead that two si’s chose different tools, tj and tk then, since agent of the same type are clones of each
other there must be at least two equilibria, because the choices of (tj , tk) and (tk, tj) are strategically
equivalent. But by assumption there’s a unique Nash equilibrium in this case. hence we’ve reached a
contradiction, so the supposition that two agents of the same type have chosen different tools must be
wrong.













ß(ii) By contradiction. From (i) we know that all agents of the same type choose the same tool. Suppose
that all the si types choose tool tk, despite the fact that the expert at that tool is sj . Obviously, then,
the status quo group cannot be a first-best composition of types: the si’s should be replaced by the
sj ’s.
ß(iii) From (ii) we know that each type is an expert at the tool it selects. The conclusion follows given
that each tool has a unique expert.
ß(iv) Suppose that the best tool for every type is t1. By construction, the expert at t1 must be the
best type, s1. Hence from (ii) we know that s1 picks t1, and from (ii) we know that no other type picks
s1. Therefore, any type that isn’t the best type picks a tool that isn’t its best tool.
Proof of Remark 2
ß(i) Consider first the case of b = 1. Here players rank-order outcomes by the probability of group
success, P (G). It is given that there is a unique tool vector (implemented by the corresponding experts)
that maximizes this probability. Hence if anyone deviates from this tool-player combination he will
reduce P (G). Since b = 1 this will reduce his expected utility, which shows that the original configuration
of tools and agents was a (strict) Nash equilibrium. Because a deviation strictly reduces the deviator’s
expected utility for b exactly equal to one, it continues to do so for b sufficiently close to one.
ß(ii) Any outcome produced by a different tool vector or by the first-best tool vector where some tool
is tried is applied by a non-expert generates a strictly lower probability of group success than does the
first-best tool vector implemented by experts. For b = 1 this probability completely determines payoffs,
so strict Pareto ordering follows immediately. The usual continuity argument for b close to one finishes
the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3: Suppose initially that b = 1. We solve the problem backwards. Suppose
that n − 1 players have chosen tools. The last player will choose the tool that maximizes P (G∗(n)),
the probability that this group, G∗(n), succeeds, given the first n − 1 choices. Anticipating this, the
second-to-last chooses the tool that induces the last player to choose the tool that, together, maximizes
P (G∗(n)). This logic works all the way back to the first player who, anticipating all subsequent choices,
chooses a tool that triggers a sequence that maximizes P (G∗(n)).
(Note that this doesn’t presume that there is a unique such sequence. Generically, i.e. for b < 1, there
is a unique sequence, but if b exactly equals one then players are indifferent about who gets to select
which tool, provided that in every case every tool is chosen by its corresponding expert.)
Since the relevant inequalities are strict for b = 1, by continuity they hold for b sufficiently close to one.
Proof of Proposition 7: Competency loading follows using the same example as in the centralized
tool choice case. Competency ordering follows if each type is best at its best tool because the first
member of each type will choose its best tool. Note that the proof requires that the group is optimal.
The manager will be careful not to select better types that have an incentive to apply a lesser types
best tool. If a type is not best at its best tool, then competency ordering fails using the same example
as in the centralized case.
We next show that monotonicity can be violated with non overlapping toolkits. We first provide a
sketch and then give the formal proof. Suppose that the best type, s1 possesses two tools, t1 and t2,
and is perfect at applying each. Under a large set of parameter values, the optimal two-person group
has two agents of the best type who choose different tools. Next, suppose the types s2 and s3, are each
perfect at tools t3 and t4 and that these tools are approximately as likely to solve the problem as the













best type’s weaker tool. For a range of parameter values a group consisting of two s1’s and one s2 both
of the agents of the best type will both choose their best tool. They do so because the s2 has some
probability of solving the problem. If this occurs, the private benefit for one of the s1’s from choosing
t2 falls more than had that problem solver chosen the best tool. The reason: the loss from getting the
entire benefit to an even split equals one half of the benefit while the loss from splitting the benefit two
ways to splitting it three ways equals only one sixth of the benefit. Thus, the optimal group of size
three consists of one of each type.
The formal proof goes as follows. We consider the special case where f(| C |) = 1|C| . Assume that if a
type can apply a tool, then it can always apply it correctly. The second problem solver of type s1 will












≤ pt1pt2 + p2
Note that this holds for any pt2 >
1
2 . By assumption, type s2 only can apply tool t3. In a group of size
three consisting of two type s1’s and one type s2, the payoff to the second type s1 from choosing tool








The payoff from choosing tool t2 can be written as follows:






It is easy to assign probabilities so that the second type s1 in a group of two would choose tool t2, but
would switch to tool t1 when a problem solver of type s2 is added. For example, if pt1 =
2
3 and b =
1
2 ,
then the second problem solver of type t1 will choose tool t2 if pt2 ≥ 13 . But if pt3 is also close to
1
3 ,
then the problem solver of type s1 would switch to tool t1 if a problem solver who uses tool t3 is added
to the group. If we set both pt2 and pt3 equal to
1
3 , then using the expressions above, the payoff for a
type s1 from choosing tool t1 equals
174
324 . The payoff from choosing tool t2 equals
169
174 . Thus, if there
were a third type of problem solver s3 and a tool t4 such that pt4 was also approximately
1
3 , then the
optimal group of size three consists of one type s1, one type s2 and one type s3.
24
We next show that the optimal team could include an undominated type, we derive the mixed strategy
equilibrium for the game with two players.
Lemma: (Equilibrium Conditions for the Two Player Mixed Strategy) Given two type s1
players with T1 = {t1, t2}, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium probability of playing tool t1, q∗,
can be written as follows:
24The inequalities are strictly satisfied of pt1 = 0.5, pt2 = pt3 = pt4 = 0.3, and b = 0.25. Note that as pt1
increases and b decreases in size, the inequalities become satisfied on an increasingly larger domain.


















where r12 equals the unique solution ratio of t1 to t2.
Proof of Lemma: Let q denote the probability that the a problem solver applies tool t1. We can solve
for the incentive compatibility constraint for using the better tool as follows. Incentive compatibility
requires that the payoff from using the tool t1 given q exceeds the payoff from using tool t2. These
payoffs can be written as follows:
π1(q) = qp1(1 +
b
2
) + (1− q)[p1(1− p2)(1 + b) + p1p2(1 +
b
2
) + (1− p1)p2]
π2(q) = q[p1p2(1 +
b
2




These can be simplified as
π1(q) = (p1 + p2 − p1p2) + (p1 −
p1p2
2




π2(q) = p2(1 +
b
2



















(p1 − p1p2) + (2p1 − p2 − p1p2)
b
2




which further reduces to
q ≤ (p1 − p1p2)(2 + b) + (p1 − p2)b
(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2)(2 + b)
It will be helpful to write the incentive compatibility constraint as follows:
q ≤ (p1 − p1p2)
(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2)
+
(p1 − p2)b
(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2)(2 + b)
(IC)
The formal counterexample relies on the same construction as the informal example presented in the
body of the paper. The probability that two problem solvers of type s1 solve the problem equals
Pr({s1, s1}, X) = (q∗)2p1 +2q∗(1−q∗)(p1 +p2−p1p2)+(1−q∗)2p2. As an example, set b = 6, p1 = 0.5
and p2 = 0.4. It follows that q
∗ = 0.75 and that Pr({s1, s1}, X) = 056875. Choose p3 = 2 · 0.06875− ε
and let p4 be arbitrarily close to p3. When the type s2 is added to the group of two type s1’s, the
equilibrium probability of playing t1 increases above 0.75, and for small ε a group of all three types
outperforms a group of two type s1’s and a type s2. A diminishing marginal returns argument implies
that two s1’s and one s2 solve the problem with higher probability than three s1’s. This implies that













the group {s1, s1, s1} solves the problem with a lower probability than the group {s1, s1, s2}, which
completes this part of the proof.
To prove that asymptotic diversity can be violated, let T (s1) = {t1} and assume that hs1(t1) = 1 and
that p(t1) = p. LetT (s2) = {t1, t2} and assume that hs2(t1) = h, hs2(t1) = θh, where θ < 1 and that
p(t2) = q < p. Finally, let T (s3) = {t2} and assume that hs3(t2) = γh where γ < θ.
Note first that a type s2 added to a group of a single type s1 will choose tool t2 if and only if it receives
a higher payoff from doing so. It’s payoff from choosing tool t2 can be written as follows:
us2(t2 | {s1}) = p(1− θhq)(1− b) + pθhq[(1− b) +
b
2
] + (1− p)θhq
Its payoff from choosing tool t1 equals




It follows that type s2 should choose tool t2 if and only if
p(1− θhq)(1− b) + pθhq[(1− b) + b
2
] + (1− p)θhq ≥ p(1− h)(1− b) + ph[(1− b) + b
2
]
which can be simplified as
ph(1− θq)(1− b) + (1− p)hθq ≥ ph(1− θq)(1− b
2
)
Canceling like terms gives
(1− p)hθq ≥ ph(1− θq) b
2
Solving for q gives
q ≥ pb
θ[2(1− p) + b]
It follows that if q and θ are sufficiently small then a problem solver of type s2 will choose tool t1 and
the optimal group of size two consists of one problem solver of type s1 and one problem solver of type
s3.
Consider the special case where p = 12 and θ =
1
2 . The inequality can then be written as reduces to
q ≥ b
(1 + b)
Note this makes intuitive sense. If there exists no collective benefit, e.g. b = 1 and θ = 12 , then tool
t2 would have to have the same probability of solving the problem as tool t1 for type s2 to choose it
because type s2 would have a fifty percent chance of solving the problem by itself.
The manager only needs one person using tool t1 but could hire more people who use tool t1 to create
incentives for a problem solver of type s2 to choose tool t2 instead of tool t1. Given that a type s1
always applies tool t1 successfully, the manager would always choose a type s1 rather than a type s2 as
it requires fewer problem solvers to align incentives.
First, we note that t suffices to show that a fixed proportion of the group would have to be of type s1’s
in order to induce a type s2 problem solver to choose tool t2. To see why suppose that there exist n













problem solvers of type s3 at least one will apply tool t2 correctly with probability1 − (1 − γh)n (this
is one minus the probability that they all fail to apply the tool correctly). Suppose that a proportion
ρ < 1 of n problem solvers of are type s2 and try tool t2. The probability that at least one applies the
tool correctly equals 1− (1− θh)ρn.
The first expression is strictly larger than the second if and only if the following strict inequality holds:
(1− γh)n < (1− θh)ρn
But this is equivalent to
(1− γh)n < [(1− θh)ρ]n
Given ρ < 1, a γ can be chosen so that this expression always holds.
It remains to show that a fixed percentage of the problem solvers must be of type s1. To simplify the
presentation, we assume b = 1, that there only a private benefit. Given n1 type s1’s using tool t1 and
n2 type s2 problem solvers using tool t2, , the expected payoff for a type s2 problem solver choosing
tool t1 can be written as the sum of two terms. The first term equals the payoff if tool t1 solves the
problem and tool t2 does not or is not applied correctly by any of the other n2 problem solvers. The
second term equals the payoff if the problem is solved by both tools. The second term is averaged over
all possible cases for the number of type s2’s who solve the problem.
ph
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]]
Define B({S}) to be the expected payoff to the problem solver of type t2 if it solves the problem and
exactly the tools in the set S solve the problem. It therefore follows that the expected payoff for the
type s2 problem solver is higher for choosing tool t2 than for choosing tool t1 if and only if
qθh [(1− p)B({t2}) + pB({t1, t2})] ≥ ph
[





qθh(1− p)B({t2}) ≥ ph
[
(1− q) + q(1− θh)n2
n1 + 1
+ q(1− θ)B({t1, t2})
]
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This expression is difficult to evaluate because of the last term. However, we can rewrite the expression









Notice that the top of the fraction equals a binomial distribution minus the last term. Therefore, we




From above, the problem of type s2 has a higher expected payoff of choosing tool t2 if and only if
qθh(1− p)B({t2}) ≥ ph
[
(1− q) + q(1− θh)n2
n1 + 1
+ q(1− θ)B({t1, t2})
]
Given that q(1− θ)B({t1, t2}) is strictly positive and therefore increases the payoff from choosing tool
t1. It suffices to show that a fixed proportion of the problem solvers must be of type s1, i.e. there exists
a ρ such that ρn1 > n2, in order for the following inequality to hold:
qθh(1− p)B({t2}) > ph
(1− q) + q(1− θh)n2
n1 + 1





(1− q) + q(1− θh)n2
n1 + 1
By the same logic as above, it suffices to show that ρn1 > n2 for some ρ > 0 for the following expression























The condition can then be written as
ω(n1 + 1) ≥ (n2 + 1)
This implies that ωn1 > n2 + (1 − ω) which means that a fixed proportion must be type s1. As an
example, suppose that p = 12 , q =
1
4 , and h =
1
3 , then ω = 1 and the number of s1’s must equal the
number of s2’s.













Proof of Remark 3
Because complete dominance implies dominance, Proposition 1 implies that under centralized tool choice
the manager would never put an s2 on the team, no matter its size. But here tool-choice is strategic, so
the manager must anticipate what the team will do in equilibrium. We turn to this now (hence we will
prove part (b) first and then turn to (a).) We initially consider the extreme cases of b = 0, hs1(t1) = 1,
and θs2(t2) is some ε close to zero.
Consider the equilibrium behavior of a pair of s1’s. Letting EV [(s1, t1); (s1, t1)] denote an s1’s expected
payoff if she plays t1 against the same choice of another s1, we get the following:
EV [(s1, t1); (s1, t1)] = [hs1(t1)]
2 · p(t1)f(|C| = 2) + hs1(t1)[1− hs1(t1)] · p(t1)f(|C| = 1)
where f(|C| = n) denotes the value of the sharing function, given that n players solved the problem.
The expected payoff of responding with a choice of t2, given that the teammate selects s1, is as follows:
EV [(s1, t2); (s1, t1)] = hs1(t2)p(t2)hs1(t1)p(t2)f(|C| = 2)
+hs1(t2)p(t2)[1− hs1(t1)]f(|C| = 1)
+hs1(t2)p(t2)hs1(t1)[1− p(t1)]f(|C| = 1)
The best response to a partner’s choice of s1 is to do likewise if EV [(s1, t1); (s1, t1)] > EV [(s1, t2); (s1, t1)].
Collecting terms and solving for p(t2), this is equivalent to
[hs1(t1)]
2 · p(t1)f(|C| = 2) + hs1(t1)[1− hs1(t1)] · p(t1)f(|C| = 1)
Ψ
> p(t2)
where Ψ = hs1(t2){hs1(t1)p(t2)f(|C| = 2) +
[




It is optimal, obviously, for an s1 to select its best tool if its partner chooses something other than
t1. Hence, if p(t2) < p
∗ ≡ [hs1 (t1)]
2·p(t1)f(|C|=2)+hs1 (t1)[1−hs1 (t1)]·p(t1)f(|C|=1)
Ψ then selecting t1 is the best
response to either pure strategy of the other player, i.e., choosing t1 is a strictly dominant strategy in
this homogeneous two-person group. Hence the unique equilibrium of this team is that both players
choose t1. This is bad news for the manager: given that hs1(t1) = 1, duplication on that tool is worthless
for her.
Now consider the equilibrium behavior of a diverse two-person team: G = (s1, s2). Given that s1
completely dominates s2 and hs2(t1) = ε, it is easy to show that the s1 player has a strictly dominant
strategy of playing her best tool, t1. Turning to the s2 player, the expected payoff of playing t1 is a
function of hs2(t2), no matter what the other player does, and since hs2(t2) = ε we can always choose ε
sufficiently close to zero so that choosing t2 delivers a higher expected payoff, again regardless of what
the other player does.25 Hence this team also has a unique equilibrium in the tool-selection stage, and
in it each type chooses his best tool.
To complete the equilibrium analysis, note that because all of the relevant payoff-inequalities (above)
hold strictly they continue to hold for b close to zero, hs1(t1) close to one, and θs2(t2) close to one.
25If hs2(t2) could be exactly zero then the expected payoff of playing t2 would obviously also be zero, whence
it would follow immediately selecting t2 is a strictly dominant strategy since (t2) is s2’s best tool and so must
have strictly positive promise. By assumption all h’s are strictly positive so technically this case does not hold,
but the corresponding intuition is correct.













With the predictions of what happens in equilibrium in mind, the manager can now figure out how to
create the optimal team in stage one. For hs1(t1) = 1, the addition of a second s1 would add no value:
the probability that a homogeneous team of the best type solves the problem is the same as a singleton
s1. In contrast, a diverse team will try t2 as well as t1, and since t2 has strictly positive promise (i.e.,
hs2(t2)p(t2) > 0), its success-probability must be strictly bigger than that of a singleton s1, who selects
only one tool (albeit the best one) or, equivalently, of the homogeneous team. Hence the manager
prefers the diverse team, which includes the completely dominated type, to the homogeneous group.
And since a homogeneous group of the completely dominated type—G = (s2, s2)—is obviously inferior
to a team which includes the best type, it follows that the optimal group is (s1, s2), thus establishing
part (a).
Proof of Remark 4: The example used in the proof of Remark 1 applies here as well. The only
difference is that type si would choose tool t1 for all but the smallest values of b implying that type si
adds no value.
Proof of Remark 5: Fix an arbitrary G∗(n). (Generically there is only one such group, but this
proof also holds for multiple optimal group-compositions.) Under centralized tool choice it is obviously
optimal to put only experts on the team. Further, since no expert is perfect at any tool there are no
optimal teams with completely superfluous members: everyone on G∗(n) is making the probability of
group success strictly greater. Consequently, carrying a non-expert cannot be free: replacing such a
member by the corresponding expert would strictly increase the probability of group success. Hence
everyone in an optimal group of size n must be the expert at the tool which s/he must select in order
to generate the corresponding optimal tool-vector.
Now consider a member of G∗(n) who is supposed to select tool tk (there may be more than one such
person) whom we will call player n. Suppose player n had exactly zero chance of correctly implementing
any tool in his toolkit other than tk. If that were true then he would have zero chance of getting any
personal credit for solving the problem by playing any tj 6= tk. This implies that playing his best tool,
tk, must be strictly better than doing anything else, no matter what his teammates are doing; i.e., if
hsn(tj) = 0 for all j 6= k then selecting tk is a strictly dominant strategy. Since this holds strictly, it
continues to hold if all of that player’s h’s (other than hsn(tk)) are sufficiently close to zero.
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